


DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE COUNSELOR  
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1958

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Dear Mr. Dulles:

I refer to my letter of April 29 transmitting for your information a working paper outlining a possible new proposal on German reunification prepared for use in discussions in Paris during the week of April 28 in the Four Power Working Group on German Reunification and the NATO Committee on European Security. I am transmitting herewith a copy of a working paper which was presented to the Four Power Working Group on Germany on April 28 and, minus Point 5 on staging, to the Committee on European Security on April 29. This document was based on the paper which was previously transmitted to you.

Following discussions in these committees, the Four Power Working Group on German Reunification drafted an interim report which was submitted to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic on May 16. Annexed to this report was an Outline Plan of German Reunification and European Security Arrangements which was submitted as a working paper to the NATO European Security Committee on May 16. The report is now being reviewed by the Department of State and the Department of Defense. A copy of this interim report is also transmitted for your information.

Sincerely yours,

G. Frederick Reinhardt

## Enclosures:

1. U. S. Working Paper Presented to Four Power Working Group April 29, 1958
2. Interim Report of Four Power Working Group, May 16, 1958.

The Honorable

Allen W. Dulles,

Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

STATE review(s) completed.

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TEXT OF UNITED STATES WORKING PAPER  
PRESENTED TO THE FOUR POWER WORKING GROUP ON GERMANY  
APRIL 28, 1958

AND, MINUS POINT 5 ON STAGING,  
TO COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY  
APRIL 29, 1958

This working paper presents a broad conceptual discussion of our preliminary thinking. It is not prepared in language designed for presentation to the Soviet Union. These thoughts are put forward at this time to permit an exchange of views at an early stage of the development of thinking. At an appropriate stage, and after the development of agreed political terms of reference, the views of the NATO military authorities should of course be sought on the military aspects of European security proposals.

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The proposals made by the Western Powers at Geneva in 1955 envisaged a set of assurances which were designed to remove any possible grounds for Soviet refusal to reunify Germany by claiming that reunification with freedom for Germany to associate with the West would constitute a danger to Soviet security. The character of certain of the assurances was not spelled out in detail and the question of the stages by which the proposals might be brought into effect was left for later negotiation.

Any new Western proposals on German reunification and European security should probably take the form of an integrated plan dealing with both subjects. Such a presentation would have the advantage of establishing clearly the link between the two sets of arrangements and clarifying the process by which the various commitments would be brought into effect. It might be desirable to make the general plan relatively brief and reserve certain of the details to annexes.

Before the question of presentation can be usefully considered, it will be necessary to determine the substance of the Western position. This paper is addressed to the problem of substance. The possible positions suggested are intended for consideration from this viewpoint. How, if they were adopted as the Western proposals they might be drafted for presentation would be a matter for subsequent consideration.

The 1955 Western proposals provided for agreement on force and arms limitation in a treaty of assurance to be concluded simultaneously with the agreement on the Eden Plan. This agreement was therefore to precede by some time the exercise by the government of a reunified Germany of its freedom of choice. How the two subjects were to be related was not made clear. It is the purpose of this paper to examine whether it is possible, consistent with our own security interests, to offer to negotiate an arrangement with the Soviets which would provide at the outset for certain clearly defined arrangements which the Soviets could be certain would go into force if they permitted reunification, regardless of the choice made by the All-German Government.

1. Relationship between European Security and German Reunification

A treaty of assurance would be concluded, simultaneously with the conclusion of an agreement to reunify Germany by the Four Powers responsible for this subject. (The agreement for the reunification of Germany would follow the Eden Plan with such revisions

as might be

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as might be appropriate.) The treaty of assurance and the agreement on reunification would enter in force at the same time but would be implemented by progressive stages to be specified.

## 2. Military Provisions

The objective to be sought in the military arrangements would be to create a military situation which would contribute to European security and which, coupled with procedures for effective inspection and control, would not prejudice the defense posture of the West vis-a-vis the Communists.

Three related zones would be established:

a) A zone of inspection against surprise attack.

The proposal would call for open inspection to include aerial and ground components, in as broad an area as possible and in any event significantly larger than the zone of force and arms limitation.

b) Zone of force and arms limitations.

The area in which such limitations would be applicable would at a minimum be all of Germany reunified and all of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Ceilings on the forces which could be maintained in each of these countries would be fixed without limitation as to national composition. (The manner of establishing the ceilings will require careful study.) We should be prepared to negotiate regarding a broader area if this were acceptable to our European allies. Armaments limitations in the area would be based on a limitation of stocks for permitted military forces and a prohibition on the manufacture of arms weapons. While, dependent on the size of the zone, the inspection procedures and other relevant factors, prohibition of the stationing in the area of certain types of weapons of strategic importance could be envisaged, there should be no provision regarding nuclear weapons other than the prohibition against manufacture in the absence of general disarmament arrangements which would provide a substantially increased measure of security.

c) A zone of "special measures."

Additional limitations ("special measures") would be applicable in an area generally comparable to the present Soviet zone of Germany and an area of comparable size and military importance in Poland and Czechoslovakia. In this area only indigenous forces required for internal security would be permitted, together with

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certain indigenous defensive military installations (for example, radar and air defense).

Agreement on adequate measures of inspection and control to insure compliance with the provisions regarding the force and arms limitations contemplated in paragraphs b and c would be an essential feature of the arrangement.

3. Assurances against Aggression

The proposals would include the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Geneva outline treaty of assurance regarding the renunciation of the use of force and the withholding of support from aggressors.

The question of whether changes could be envisaged in Article 8 of the Geneva proposals is still under study.

4. Other Provisions

No change would be made in the Geneva proposals regarding consultation, recognition of the right of individual and collective self-defense, and withdrawal of forces at the request of the government in whose territory they are stationed.

5. Entry into Force by Stages ||

The phasing of the implementation of the plan should insure that no irrevocable change in the present situation should be made until it is clear that the U.S.S.R. intends to carry out its corresponding obligations under the treaty. A phasing along the following lines would seem to meet this requirement. ||

a. The provisions regarding the renunciation of the use of force and the withholding of support from aggressors and the arrangements for the prevention of surprise attack would be implemented upon the entry into force of the agreement.

b. Agreement on the detailed measures necessary for inspection and control of force and arms limitation should be required at some intermediate stage prior to the creation of an all-German government and the entry into force of the limitations on force and armaments.

c. The limitations on force and armaments should not go into effect until the system of inspection and control has been established and until an all-German government has been created and has assumed the power necessary to carry out its engagements and exercise its rights under the treaty.

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INTERIM REPORT OF THE FOUR POWER WORKING  
GROUP ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION

Task of the Working Group

The Working Group has been giving consideration to the Western position on German reunification in relation to European Security in anticipation of a possible Summit Conference. In doing so, the Group has maintained close contact with the North Atlantic Council, through the N.A.T.O. Committee on European Security. The North Atlantic Council looks to the Four Governments for advice on German reunification in view of their special concern with this subject.

2. The Working Group has held three meetings in Paris, on March 25 - 26, April 28 - 30 and May 13 - 16. During these sessions, it has met jointly with the N.A.T.O. European Security Committee on several occasions.

Conclusions with regard to this task

3. In its report of March 15, 1957, the Working Group analysed in some detail the considerations bearing on the Western position regarding German reunification in relation to European Security. The Group considers that the conclusions which it reached at that time remain generally valid. In the interim, the Soviet Government has made clear in a number of ways that it is not disposed to enter into negotiations on the subject of German reunification. Indeed, it now maintains that the matter is not one which is appropriate for international discussion. At the same time, the Soviet Government continues to put forward various proposals in the purported interest of relaxing international tension which would have the effect of reducing the effectiveness of the Western defence posture in Europe and freezing the status quo in Germany.

4. In these circumstances, there is little prospect that the Soviet Union can be engaged in a genuine negotiation on the subject of German reunification at a possible Summit Meeting. On the other hand, unless the Western Powers conduct their discussions with the Soviets with great care, they may risk giving the impression that they have accepted the Soviet thesis.

5. The Working Group accordingly believes that the Western Powers should maintain the position that there can be no genuine relaxation of tension in Europe unless Germany is reunified and that measures aiming at European Security would be illusory unless this

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condition were fulfilled. It also believes that the Western Powers should be prepared to put forward proposals which would demonstrate that the West is prepared to enter into a genuine negotiation on these matters, as was stated in the Berlin Declaration of July, 1957. To convince public opinion that this is the case, any new Western proposals must take into account the misunderstandings and criticisms which were generated by the Western proposals put forward at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' meeting of 1955.

6. In considering these matters, the Working Group has reached the following conclusions:

- (a) The principles of the Eden Plan should be maintained, including the principle of Four Power responsibility for the reunification of Germany;
- (b) It is essential to preserve the link between German reunification and European Security;
- (c) It would be necessary to produce a simple presentation, which would be clear and intelligible to public opinion, of any Western proposals on reunification and European Security which were to be put forward at a Conference with the Soviet Government;
- (d) Any new Western proposals on reunification and European Security should take the form of an integrated plan which would establish the close link between the procedure for reunification and the progressive entry into force of security arrangements;
- (e) Any new proposals should demonstrate clearly that the West would be prepared to participate in appropriate security arrangements in Europe in the event of German reunification, irrespective of the choice of alliances made by an All-German Government.

"Outline Plan for German Reunification and European Security Arrangements"

7. In accordance with these conclusions, the attached "Outline Plan for German Reunification and European Security Arrangements" was drafted at the meetings of the Working Group in Paris from May 12 - 16 and was submitted as a working paper to the N.A.T.O. European Security Committee on May 16 for their comments on the security aspects. This "Outline Plan" is a tentative first draft only.

8. The Plan is a phased combination of the "Eden Plan" for German reunification and the Outline Treaty of Assurance which were

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put forward by the Western Powers at Geneva in October 1955. Two separate interconnected agreements would be required. The agreement on German reunification would be between the Four Powers (i.e. including the Soviet Union). This agreement would be superseded by the conclusion of a German Peace Treaty. Participation in the agreement on European Security would have to include all countries whose territories or forces were affected by it.

9. The following are the main new features in the Plan as compared with the Geneva plans:-

- (a) the way in which the security arrangements would enter into force by stages, as envisaged in the Geneva plans, is spelled out;
- (b) provision is made for security arrangements which would enter into force on the reunification of Germany and would remain in force whatever the choice made by the all-German Government with respect to its alliances;
- (c) it is proposed that a zone of limitation of forces and armaments should be established in Europe as soon as an all-German Government has acceded to the European Security Agreement;
- (d) it is proposed that measures to guard against surprise attack should be established in an area which would be significantly larger than that of the zone of limitation ((c) above).

Questions raised by the "Outline Plan"

10. Measures against surprise attack

In their disarmament proposals of August 29, 1957, the Western Powers accepted the creation of a European zone of measures against surprise attack only on certain conditions, which were set out in their plan for measures of partial disarmament. A certain number of questions are raised if the zone of measures against surprise attack is dissociated from the disarmament proposals as a whole and placed in the context of European security. In the course of a negotiation with the Soviet Government, it is likely that the tendency would be to reduce the extent of the zone and that in these conditions a zone of control and inspection in Europe might evolve sooner or later into a zone of force and armaments limitations.

11. The following points deserve study:-

- (a) Can this zone be dissociated from the complete disarmament

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proposals of August 29, 1957? In particular, can it be dissociated from the creation of an extra-European zone?

- (b) If the answer to the above is yes: at what stage in the process of German reunification and European security measures should the creation of such a zone be put; and what should be the extent of the zone and the nature of the control and inspection measures to be applied in it?

12. Zones of Limitation

Apart from the zone of inspection against surprise attack (see the preceding paragraph) two other types of zone are envisaged:-

- (a) a zone of limitation of forces and armaments;
- (b) a zone of "special measures".

13. Zone of limitation of forces and armaments

Two questions arise, namely at what stage in the Plan should it be proposed to establish the zone and, secondly, what should be the extent and nature of the zone. On the first question, it will be recalled that the Geneva plans did not make it clear whether the zone of limitation of forces and armaments provided for in the Geneva Treaty of Assurance was only applicable if a reunified Germany joined N.A.T.O. It is now proposed to make it clear that the zone should apply whatever the German choice about alliances. This is recommended because it would meet the criticism levelled against the Geneva Plans that the security arrangements were conditional on Germany joining N.A.T.O.

14. On the second question, viz. the extent and nature of the zone, the plans put forward at Geneva did not go into detail. We had not at that stage even reached agreement among ourselves about what we should propose if we got into detailed negotiations with the Soviet Government. As regards our position now, it would probably be premature to try to work out precise details of our position on force levels or armaments until:-

- (i) there is a real prospect of genuine negotiations with the Soviet Government on this subject and we can judge the political climate accordingly; and
- (ii) progress on disarmament negotiations at that time is known.

It may, however, be possible to reach agreement on the area of the zone, i.e. whether it should apply to all Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, as proposed by the Standing Group in 1955, or

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should cover a larger or smaller area. This question requires further study.

15. "Special measures"

This could mean anything from total demilitarization to the simple removal of non-indigenous forces. Two concepts have been considered, neither of which involve total demilitarization which the Working Group considered would probably be unacceptable:-

- (i) Retention only of indigenous security forces, together with certain indigenous defensive military installations, in an area generally comparable to the present Soviet Zone of Germany and in an area of comparable size and military importance in Poland and Czechoslovakia;
- (ii) The same limitations as in (i) confined to the Soviet Zone of Germany.

16. The concept at (i) is in effect what was proposed at Geneva in the Treaty of Assurance. (The United States representative considered that this proposal could be applicable regardless of Germany's choice of alliances.) The advantage is that an area of Poland and Czechoslovakia would be included, i.e. the Soviet forces would be removed as far as possible to the East. The disadvantage is that this may be thought too much to ask of the Soviet Government, who would have already had to withdraw their forces from the East Zone of Germany.

17. The concept at (ii) is the interpretation which the United Kingdom representative placed on the commitment which the Western Powers have accepted in the Berlin Declaration of July 29, 1957 "not to take military advantage as a result of the withdrawal of Soviet forces" from East Germany if Germany joined N.A.T.O. It would have neither the advantage nor the disadvantage of the concept at (i). Politically it would have greater appeal but from a military point of view it would be less advantageous. In the British view it would be applicable only if Germany joined N.A.T.O.

18. As an alternative to these possibilities another concept has been put forward by the German representative. It has been included in square brackets (under reservations by the other representatives) at point (2) under the General Provisions in the "Outline Plan". Under this concept, whatever choice of alliances an all-German Government made, non-indigenous forces stationed in Germany would not be advanced beyond the area in which they were stationed. This means that, if Germany joined N.A.T.O., non-German N.A.T.O. forces would not move into the area of the present Soviet Zone (from which Soviet forces would be withdrawn). In the hypothetical case of Germany joining the Warsaw Pact, Soviet forces would be precluded from moving

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into the present territory of the Federal Republic. The main advantage of this concept is that it is manifestly fair to both sides and would be applicable whatever choice of alliances Germany made. The disadvantage, from the Western point of view, is that it does not provide for a corresponding withdrawal of Soviet forces from a comparable area in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

19. Accession of an all-German Government to the Security Agreement

One problem, which was not resolved in 1955, is how to ensure that a reunified Germany will join the European Security Agreement. Since this Agreement is being offered to the Soviet Government with the object of inducing them to agree to German reunification, we ought in some way to show that a reunified Germany will be bound to accept the obligations under it. It is not easy to do this without conflicting with the sovereignty of an all-German Government. But we must somehow indicate that, whatever the political choice of an all-German Government, the military arrangements within which it will be formed will be those established by the European Security Agreement. In practice, however, these arrangements, in particular the zone of limitation of forces and armaments, cannot be established without Germany's participation. We have attempted to resolve this problem by providing, in Section V of the "Outline Plan", that the limitation of forces and armaments (which is the kernel of the security arrangements) shall not be put into effect until the all-German Government has acceded to the European Security Agreement. We realise that the Soviet Government might argue that this provision was not sufficient, in the absence of a corresponding provision in Section VI of the Plan to the effect that the rights of the all-German Government under the Agreement on Reunification would not be operative until German accession to the European Security Agreement had taken place. But we think it would be undesirable to insert in the Plan a provision of this kind inhibiting the freedom of action of an all-German Government. In any case, the all-German Government would have the strongest possible inducement to accede to the European Security Agreement in that only by doing so would they secure the rights under that Agreement. This applies especially to point (1) of the General Provisions, namely the right to request the withdrawal of non-German forces from Germany. If the all-German Government do not acquire this right, the Soviet Government's Reserved Right to continue to station forces in Germany will remain unqualified pending the conclusion of the Peace Treaty. If the Soviet Government raised this point they could be told that the precise formula for linking Sections V and VI of the "Outline Plan" would have to be the subject of detailed negotiation when the agreements were being drafted.

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## 20. Exercise of the Reserved Rights

In point (b) of the General Provisions of the "Outline Plan" it is stated that decisions of the all-German bodies could not be disapproved except by a majority vote of the Four Powers. This formula has been taken from the Eden Plan. It avoids giving the Soviet Government a veto on decisions of the all-German bodies. But since the only possible majority is a Western one, it looks unfair to the Soviet Government. The alternative is to provide for unanimity, for which there are precedents in, e.g. Austria. But this would give the Soviet Government the power of veto if the Western Powers considered it necessary to exercise their Reserved Rights. The question at issue is whether the present formula should be retained or whether we should be prepared to concede "unanimity".

## 21. Obligation to react against aggression

The final provision of the Geneva Treaty of Assurance, which was to enter into force only if Germany joined N.A.T.O., was the acceptance by parties to the Treaty of Assurance of an obligation to react against aggression by a N.A.T.O. member against a non-member of N.A.T.O., and vice-versa. This has been omitted from the "Outline Plan" since, in the form in which this commitment was offered at Geneva, it is not appropriate to an Agreement which would apply irrespective of Germany's choice of alliances. It is recommended that the offer of this commitment should be repeated in whatever manner seems most appropriate at the time.

## Decisions to be taken

22. Decisions on the following points are required:-

- (a) Is the general scheme of the "Outline Plan" acceptable?
- (b) Can the proposal for a zone of measures against surprise attack be taken out of the disarmament context and put into the context of European security? If so, what should be the extent and nature of the zone? And at what stage in the process of reunification/ European security should it be introduced? (paragraphs 10 and 11)
- (c) Is it agreed that the zone of limitation should be established irrespective of the all-German Government's choice about alliances? What should be the extent of this zone? (paragraphs 13 and 14)

(d)

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- (d) Should the "special measures" be confined to Germany or should a wider zone be proposed? Should these measures apply in any case or only if Germany joins N.A.T.O.? If they are to be confined to Germany and to apply in any case, is the German proposal in paragraph 18 acceptable? (paragraphs 15 - 18)
- (e) Is it agreed that the question of German accession to the European Security Agreement should be dealt with as in paragraph 19?
- (f) As regards the exercise of Reserved Rights, should we stick to "majority vote" (as in the Eden Plan) or change to "unanimity"? (paragraph 20).

PARIS,

May 16, 1958.

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INTERIM REPORT BY THE FOUR POWER WORKING GROUP ON  
GERMAN REUNIFICATION TO THE N.A.T.O. EUROPEAN  
SECURITY COMMITTEE

In his reports to the Committee on March 27 and May 1, the Chairman of the Four Power Working Group on German reunification reported that the Working Group were examining the Eden Plan for German reunification and the Treaty of Assurance put forward by the Western Powers at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference with particular reference to the problem of phasing the procedure for reunification with the security arrangements.

2. The Working Group have now prepared the attached draft paper entitled "Outline Plan for German Reunification and European Security Arrangements". In preparing this paper, the Working Group have had the following purposes in view:

- (a) to give a "new look" to the Eden Plan without departing from its basic principles.
- (b) to establish a close link between the procedure for reunification and the progressive entry into force of security arrangements, which would be put into effect irrespective of the choice of alliances made by an all-German Government.

3. The attached paper represents an effort to set forth a framework into which the Western proposals regarding European Security could be fitted. In preparing it, the Working Group have proceeded on the assumption that the force and arms limitations will be of such a character that they could be applicable regardless of the choice which a reunited Germany made with respect to its alliances. The attached paper would require re-examination should this not be the case.

4. The Working Group do not regard the question of additional assurance to be given the Soviet Union in the event that a reunified Germany joins N.A.T.O. (Article 8 of the Geneva Outline Terms of a Treaty of Assurance) as a question of phasing. It is rather a matter of additional obligations to be undertaken in one specific contingency. The Working Group still have the question of possible changes in Article 8 under consideration.

5. The Outline Plan provides for the simultaneous establishment of European security arrangements and German reunification in accordance with a phased programme which would enter into force by stages. The Plan would be elaborated in detail in agreements to be negotiated between the Four Powers, with the participation of other Powers concerned in the case of the European security arrangements.

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6. The members of the Working Group would be grateful for the observations of the European Security Committee on the security aspects of the Outline Plan.

PARIS  
May 16, 1958.

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OUTLINE PLAN FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND EUROPEAN  
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The following is an outline of the plan for German reunification and the establishment of European security arrangements, details of which would be included in agreements to be negotiated between the Powers concerned:-

I

Initial Security Undertakings in Europe

On entry into force of the agreements, each party would undertake:-

- (1) to settle, by peaceful means, any international dispute in which it was involved with any other party;
- (2) to refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
- (3) to withhold assistance, military and economic, to an aggressor;
- (4) to consult with the other parties regarding the implementation of the agreements.

II

All-German Elections

Three months after the entry into force of the agreements, free elections under international supervision would take place throughout Germany for an all-German National Assembly.

III

The National Assembly

The National Assembly would proceed as quickly as possible with the drafting of a Constitution and with the formation of an all-German Government under it.

Pending the formation of an all-German Government the National Assembly could set up a provisional all-German authority charged with assisting the Assembly in drafting the Constitution and with preparing the nucleus of all-German executive organs. The provisional all-German authority could initiate preliminary negotiations for a Peace Treaty.

The National Assembly would determine how the powers of the Federal Government and of the authorities in the Soviet zone should be

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transferred to the all-German Government and how the two former should be brought to an end.

IV

Measures against Surprise Attack

A system of inspection to guard against surprise attack would be established over an area in Europe which should be as broad as possible and in any event significantly larger than the zone of limitation of forces and armaments to be established under V.

V

Limitation of Forces and Armaments

When the all-German elections had been completed, a start should be made towards the establishment of a zone of limitation of forces and armaments.

The first step would be to set up machinery for the purpose of controlling and inspecting the limitations.

The agreed limitations would be carried out progressively under the control and inspection of this machinery as soon as:-

- (a) the machinery was in a position effectively to exercise its functions; and
- (b) the all-German Government had assumed the powers necessary to fulfil the obligations and exercise the rights under the agreements and had acceded to the European Security Agreement.

VI

The All-German Government

The all-German Government would have authority to assume or reject the international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone of Germany and to conclude such other international agreements as it might wish.

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† The Working Group has not yet reached a conclusion as to the time at which these measures should be introduced.

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The all-German Government would have all the rights of individual and collective self-defence recognised by the United Nations Charter.

The all-German Government would be responsible for the negotiation and conclusion of the Peace Treaty.

General Provisions

(1) No party to the agreement on European Security would continue to station forces on the territory of any other party without the latter's consent and, upon the request of the party concerned, any party would withdraw its forces within a stated period.

(2) Whatever decisions the all-German Government might take with regard to the international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone of Germany, non-German forces stationed in Germany would not be advanced beyond the area in which they were stationed at the time of entry into force of the agreement on European Security.<sup>7</sup>

(3) Pending the conclusion of a Peace Treaty and subject to (1) above, each of the Four Powers might exercise with respect to the National Assembly, the provisional all-German authority and the all-German Government only those of its rights which related to the stationing of armed forces in Germany, the protection of their security, Berlin, the reunification of Germany and the Peace Settlement.

(4) Decisions of the National Assembly, the provisional all-German authority and the all-German Government in fulfilment of the agreements would not require the approval of the Four Powers and could not be disapproved except by a majority vote of the Four Powers.

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In order to conclude agreements on the above lines, the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States propose that the Four Powers should appoint representatives:-

- (1) to draw up together with representatives of other Powers concerned a plan for the establishment of a zone of limitation of forces and armaments, including measures for effective supervision and control of the limitations;
- (2) similarly, to draw up a plan for the establishment of a system of inspection to guard against surprise attack;

(3) to

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- (3) to draft, in consultation with German experts, a German Electoral Law and to make recommendations for the supervision of the elections in order to ensure that they take place in conditions of genuine freedom.

Separate Working Groups should be set up for each of these purposes, with instructions to submit their reports to the Governments within a stated period. These reports would provide the basis for agreements on the reunification of Germany and on European security arrangements.

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